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JURISDICTION 
This appeal involves a Petition for Review filed by the 
defendant below, American Roofing Company and/or Employees 
Mutual Liability, seeking reversal of an Industrial Commission 
workers compensation final Order issued April 22, 1987. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 35-1-83 (1987 Supp.) the Utah Court 
of Appeals is the reviewing court for final Industrial 
Commission workers compensation Orders. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Utah Supreme Court case Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), is determinative of the main issue on 
appeal (Point I). This case is significant in that it 
redefines how to analyze the threshold requirements necessary 
for a finding that an industrial injury is compensable. The 
statutory provisions Utah Code Ann., 39-1-67 (1987 Supp.) and 
Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1987 Supp.) are determinative of the 
compensation rate to be paid Mr. Green. The entire text of 
both sections have been reproduced in the Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission correctly determined that Mr. Green's 
September 6, 1985 injury was a compensable industrial 
accident. It is clear the injury was the unexpected and 
unintended result of Mr. Green lifting a bucket out of his 
truck. That Mr. Green had previous back problems and pain does 
not cause the September 6, 1985 injury to be expected or even 
foreseeable. Medical causation is undisputed and legal 
causation is supported by the facts. Mr. Green did the lifting 
in an unusually strenuous manner and the bucket got caught 
causing additional exertion to free it. As the exertion 
involved was greater than that expected in everyday 
non-employment life, the legal causation test is met. As both 
the criteria for medical and legal causation are established, 
and as the injury was clearly unexpected, the September 6, 1985 
injury is compensable and the Commission's finding should 
therefore be affirmed. 
The Commission's computation of Mr. Green's 
compensation rate was figured based on the applicable statutes 
with a minor adjustment due to the unusual result of the 
statutory compensation rate being greater than that of his 
actual weekly earnings. The rate figured by the Commission 
should be affirmed as it is the result of applying the correct 
statutory provisions, general workers compensation po?icy and 
principals of fairness. It is conceded that Commission's 
failure to order reimbursement to the appellant for medical 
expenses was an oversight. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT GEORGE ROY GREEN 
SUSTAINED A COMPENSABLE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 6, 
1985 IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
The test used to determine the compensability of an 
industrial injury is set forth in the Utah Supreme court case 
Allen vs Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). To 
establish compensability, the Allen test requires that there be 
an "accident," as further defined in Allen, and a causal 
connection between the injury and the employment. The 
appellant argues that the evidence suppprts neither a finding 
that an "accident" occurred nor a finding that the employment 
caused the injury. 
The appellant argues first that the manner in which 
Mr. Green was injured does not meet the requirements of the 
Allen definition of an accident. The Allen definition of an 
accident is nan unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be 
either the cause or the result of an injury." Allen at 22. 
The appellant states that neither the cause nor the result of 
Mr. Green's injury was unexpected, and thus, no "accident" 
occurred. 
A. Mr. Green's injury was "by accident," 
Although it is conceded that the cause of the injury, 
the lifting of the bucket of debris, was expected, the result 
of the injury was definitely not expected. Mr. Green did not 
expect that after lifting the bucket he would reinjure his back 
in such a way as to cause him to be unable to return to work. 
Thus, the reinjury was an unexpected and unintended result of 
the lifting. 
The appellant notes that prior to the 1985 incident, 
Mr. Green periodically experienced episodes of pain in the low 
back similar to the pain that he experienced on September 6, 
1985 after lifting the bucket. From this, the appellant 
concludes that the September 6, 1985 injury was not 
unexpected. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily 
follow, unless one presumes that once one experiences pain it 
can be expected to reoccur at any time. The report of Dr. 
Henrie quoted by the appellant uses terms such as 
"periodically" and "occasionally" to refer to Mr. Green's 
previous back problems. Appellant's Brief at 17. This 
indicates that Mr. Green's back problems were on and off. The 
pain and discomfort did not occur always as result of one 
certain type of activity. The record does not reflect that 
every time Mr. Green lifted a bucket he had the same type of 
pain in his back. The fact that Mr. Green had back pain in the 
past does not necessitate the conclusion Mr. Green expected the 
reinjury and reoccurrence of pain on September 6, 1985 when he 
lifted the bucket. The more logical conclusion is that the 
pain and disability suffered by Mr. Green following the 
September 6, 1985 incident were unintlended and unexpected 
results of the reinjury. 
The appellant cites the case Hone vs J. F. Shea 
Company, 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1985) in support of the 
appellants conclusion that Mr. Green1s reinjury was expected, 
and thus, not "by accident." Appellant's Brief at 17. The 
appellant states that in the Hone case, the court found that 
the reason Mr. Hone's back injury was determined to be by 
accident was because his injury was unforeseeable as he had 
never before had back problems. Even if the court in Hone is 
concluding that because Mr. Hone had no previous back problems 
his back injury was unforeseeable, and therefore "by accident," 
does not mean that the court would have reached the opposite 
conclusion had Mr. Hone had previous back problems. The court 
may be saying no previous problems causes an injury to be 
unforeseeable. The court does not conclude previous problems 
necessitate a finding that a reinjury is forseeable and 
expected. So the Hone decision does not support a finding of 
no accident in Mr. Green*s case simply based on his previous 
back problems. 
B. Both legal and medical cassation have been 
established. 
Because Mr. Green's reinjury was the unexpected result 
of the lifting incident, his reinjury was "by accident." 
Having met the requirement that his injury was by accident, to 
show his injury is compensable, Mr. Green need only show that 
the causation element of the Allen test is also established. 
As noted by the appellant, the Allen causation test requires 
that both legal and medical cause be established. The medical 
panel report findings adopted by the Administrative Law Judge 
conclude the requisite medical causation is established and 
those findings are not at issue. At issue is the legal 
causation factor. The appellant argues that Mr. Green was not 
injured in a manner that supports a finding of legal 
causation. Appellant's Brief at 18. 
The Allen case sets up a dual standard for legal 
causation; one standard for employees who have no pre-existing 
conditions related to the job injury, and one for employees 
suffering from a pre-existing condition that is related to the 
job injury. Allen at 26. Those with no related pre-existing 
condition need show only that they were injured while exerting 
themselves in an ordinary or usual manner. Those with a 
related pre-existing condition need to show they were injured 
pursuant to unusual or extraordinary exertion. The court in 
Allen makes it clear that the unusualness of the exertion is 
measured as against an objective standard of the exertion faced 
by people in today's society in normal non-employment 
activities. Allen at 26. Mr. Green had a pre-existing back 
condition prior to his September 6, 1985 back injury, and 
therefore, in order to meet the more stringent legal causation 
standard, Mr. Green must show he was exerting himself unusually 
as compared to normal non-employment activities when he 
sustained his back injury on September 6, 1985. 
The appellant argues that Mr, Green's lifting of the 
bucket from the back of his truck is not iftnusual as compared to 
a sample list of everyday non-employment activities offered by 
the court in the Allen case. That list is quoted by the 
appellant as follows. 
Typical activities and exertions expected of men 
and women in the latter part of the twentieth 
century, for example, include taking full garbage 
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to chest height 
and climbing the stairs in building. 
Appellants Brief at 19 and Allen at 26. However, in comparing 
the list to Mr. Green's activity on thfc date of injury, the 
appellant alters the list by adding the elements of leaning 
over and reaching while lifting to each of the activities 
listed. Appellant's brief at 20. In so doing, the appellant 
finds that the activities are similar to the leaning over, 
reaching and lifting that Mr. Green engaged in when he was 
injured on September 6, 1985; the conclusion being no unusual 
exertion and thus failure to establish legal causation. 
Certainly each of the activities in the list could be unusually 
exertive if done in a different manner than the way one would 
normally expect to perform the task. Ifi the lifting described 
in each of the listed activities were done from the ground, by 
bending the knees, holding the object close to the chest, and 
raising up by straightening the legs and keeping the back 
straight, the lifting is completely different in nature from 
the lifting of the same object from wai^t level, up, and while 
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leaning and reaching at the same time, the way it was found Mr. 
Green lifted the bucket. (R. at 259 and 319.) 
One element of the lifting not mentioned by the 
appellant is the fact the bucket got caught on something as Mr. 
Green tried to pull the bucket out of the truck. (R. at 259.) 
This catching of the bucket combined with the leaning and 
reaching are elements of the lifting that cannot be ignored. 
The manner in which an object is lifted was noted by the 
Commission in its final Order on review as being significant 
for purposes of applying the legal causation unusual exertion 
standard. In fact, the Commission found that it was the more 
exertive manner in which the lifting was done that caused the 
Commission to find Mr. Green's activity to be unusually 
exertive, thereby causing the legal causation test to be met. 
(R. at 319.) The Commission also noted the fact that lifting 
heavy objects from the back of the truck was an activity which 
can be expected to occur frequently in Mr. Green's profession. 
(R. at 319.) With respect to the risk created by the 
employment, the Allen case states: 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a pre-existing condition must show that the 
employment contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life 
because of his condition. This additional element of 
risk in the work place is usually supplied by an 
exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, 
everyday life. 
Allen at 25. Mr. Green's employment contributed to the risk he 
already faced in everyday life by adding the extra risk of the 
unloading of heavy items from the back of a truck crowded with 
supplies. Per the Allen rationale, this extra risk justifies 
creating liability for the employer. 
In conclusion, the Commission analyzed the manner in 
which Mr. Green injured himself and determined the more 
exertive manner of the lifting was a ri$k associated with the 
employment and was not an everyday risk faced by people in 
today!s society in non-employment life. The Commission thereby 
correctly applied the Allen legal causation test to the facts 
specified in the Administrative Law Judge's Order. The 
Commission's conclusion that the legal causation test is met, 
and the conclusion that Mr. Green's injury was "by accident" 
are analyzed correctly and supported by the facts. As such, 
the commission's decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious 
and therefore should be affirmed. Kaiser Steel Corporation vs 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Norton vs the Industrial 
Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S COMPUTATION OF MR. GREEN'S 
COMPENSATION RATE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED AS IT IS BASED ON BOTH 
APPLICABLE STATUTATORY PROVISIONS, UTAH CODE ANN., 35-1-67 
(1987 SUPP.) AND UTAH CODE ANN., 35-1-75 (1987 SUPP.) 
There are two statutory provisions which dictate how 
the compensation rate is to be determined for an individual 
entitled to permanent total disability. Those two provisions 
are Utah Code Ann., 35-1-67 (1987 Supp.) and Utah Code Ann., 
35-1-75 (1987 Supp.) In order to determine the compensation 
rate, you must first determine what the average weekly wage 
is. Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1987 Supp.) specifies how the 
average weekly wage is determined. Subsection (1) (e) 
specifies how the compensation rate for a worker receiving an 
hourly wage is to be figured. That section reads as follows: 
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage 
shall be determined by multiplying the 
hourly rate by the number of hours the 
employee would have worked for the week if 
the accident had not intervened. In no case 
shall the hourly wage be multiplied by less 
than 20 for the purpose of determining the 
weekly wage. 
Applying that subsection to the facts in Mr. Green's case, his 
average weekly wage would be 20 hours times his hourly rate of 
$15.47 per hour, or $309.40 per week. Next, the compensation 
rate is figured by applying the provisions of Utah Code Ann., 
35-1-67 (1987 Supp.) which specifies in relevant part, "in 
cases of permanent total disability, the employee shall receive 
66-2/3% of his average weekly wage at the time of the injury." 
Applying that provision to the average weekly of $309.40 per 
week, the compensation rate is $206.37 per week. 
In the Commission's Order on review, the Commission 
notes that the compensation rate of $206.37 per week is 
actually higher than Mr. Green's actual average weekly wage of 
$201.11 per week. (R. at 318.) Because it would violate 
general workers compensation policy to pay an injured employee 
more than what the employee actually received working, the 
Commission reduced the compensation rate to $201.00 per week so 
as to give effect to the provisions of Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 
(1) (e) (requiring the 20 hour minimum) without violating 
general workers compensation policy. 
The appellant argues that Utafo Code Ann., 35-1-75 
(1985 Supp.) (the average weekly wage provision) is a general 
statutory provision and that the more specific Utah Code Ann., 
35-1-67 (1987 Supp.) (specifying how the permanent total 
disability compensation rate is figured) takes precedence over 
Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1987 Supp.). Appellant's Brief at 
23. However, because the Utah Code Ann.. 35-1-67 (1987 Supp.) 
manner of determining the compensation gate is not applicable 
until after the average weekly wage of Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 
(1987 Supp.) is figured, there is no need to reason that one 
provision takes precedence over the othec Application of Utah 
Code Ann., 35-1-67 (1987 Supp.) requir0s the application of 
Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1987 Supp.) first in order to 
determine what figure will be multiplied by 66-2/3% to arrive 
at the compensation rate. There is no conflict in applying 
both provisions sequentially as specified above. 
The appellant argues that it is a work disincentive to 
pay Mr. Green at the same rate as he w#s paid while working. 
However, Mr. Green has been determined to be permanently and 
totally disabled. Presumably, he cannot return to work no 
matter what incentive exists. In fact, basing the compensation 
rate on a strict 66-2/3% of the actual average weekly wage, 
without application of Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1) (e) (1987 
Supp.) is a work disincentive to individuals like Mr. Green. 
Mr. Green could have continued to work full time until his back 
gave out completely at a much earlier date due to the full time 
work stress. Presumably, he would have decided to do just that 
(work full time), if he knew that any disability benefits he 
would receive would be cut in half if he tried to work 
part-time. Instead, because of increased problems with his 
back, Mr. Green stayed in the work force to the extent he was 
able, working part-time. This kind of effort should be 
encouraged by giving effect to Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1987 
Supp.), basing the average weekly wage on a minimum of 20 hours 
per week. 
The Commission would be abusing its discretion if it 
decided to ignore Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1) (e) (1987 Supp.) 
by refusing to apply it. The fact is the provision exists and 
it cannot be ignored. Presumably, the legislature wished to 
place a minimum on the number of hours used to figure the 
average weekly wage for the benefit of workers injured on 
part-time jobs. The Commission can only enforce what law 
exists. Because the Commission decision gives effect to both 
Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75, Utah Code Ann., 35-1-67, the general 
policies regarding workers compensation and general principals 
of fairness, it should be affirmed. To do as the appellant 
suggests is to completely ignore Utah Code Ann., 35-1-75 (1) 
(e) (1987 Supp.) as if it were never passed. 
POINT III 
AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY AND/OR EMPLOYER ' S MUTUAL 
LIABILITY IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT ON MEDICAL EXPENSES OUT 
OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND AS ARGUED BY THS APPELLANT. 
In Point III of the appellant's Brief (at 30.)» the 
appellant notes that the absence of a paragraph in the final 
Commission Order dealing with reimbursement of medical expenses 
to American Roofing Company and/or Employer's Mutual Liability 
out of the Second Injury Fund was most likely an oversight on 
the part of the Industrial Commission. It is conceded the 
Commission neglected to Order medical expense reimbursement to 
American Roofing Company and/or Employer's Mutual Liability and 
it is thus conceded American Roofing Company and/or Employer's 
Mutual Liability is entitled to be reimbursed 2/3rds of its 
verified expenditures for medical treatment in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's finding that Wr. Green's injury on 
September 6, 1985 was the result of a compensable industrial 
accident should be affirmed. The injury sustained by Mr. Green 
was "by accident" as it was neither intended nor expected that 
he would suffer the injury and disability that resulted from 
the incident. Simply because he experienced back problems and 
similar episodes of pain in the past, does not mean he expected 
to reinjure himself September 6, 1985. In addition to the 
injury being accidental, there is sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of legal causation. Because he had 
pre-existing problems, in order to establish legal causation, 
Mr. Green's reinjury had to be the result of exertion greater 
than that which occurs in everyday non-employment activity. 
The Commission analyzed the lifting incident that caused the 
injury, taking into consideration the weight of the bucket 
lifted, the body position used and the fact the bucket got 
caught. There is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings that the injury was "by accident" and the 
result of unusual exertion. The factual analysis made by the 
Commission and the reasoning used by the Commission in applying 
the facts to the law makes it clear that the Commission's 
findings are neither arbitrary nor capricious. Therefore, the 
Commission's conclusions regarding the compensability of Mr. 
Green's injury should be affirmed. 
The manner in which the Commission computed Mr. 
Green's compensation rate is dictated by two separate statutory 
provisions. The Commission adjusted the rate pursuant to 
"fairness" so that the unusual result of a compensation rate 
higher than the actual average weekly wage did not occur. To 
figure the compensation rate as the appellant suggests requires 
completely ignoring a statutory provision, which would be an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission. The 
Commission's manner of computing the compensation rate should 
be affirmed as it takes into account all the applicable 
statutory provisions as well as general workers compensation 
policy and fairness. 
Finally, it is conceded the appellant is entitled to 
Second Injury Fund reimbursement for medical expenses. 
Therefore, it is requested that the final Commission Order be 
affirmed, as being supported by substantial evidence, with the 
provision that the appellant be allowed Second Injury Fund 
reimbursement for medical expenses. Omitting a paragraph for 
reimbursement in the final Commission Order was an oversight. 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability - Amount of 
payments - Vocational rehabilitation - Procedure and payments -
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall 
receive 66 & 2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of 
the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not 
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
injury per week. However, in no cas£ of permanent total 
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be 
required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 
312 weeks, A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until 
such time as the following proceedings have been had: If the 
employee has tentatively been found to permanently and totally 
disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission 
of Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under the state board of education for 
rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the 
commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of the second injury fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation 
and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training 
of such employee shall generally follow the practice applicable 
under section 35-1-69, and relating to the rehabilitation of 
employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that 
such employee has fully cooperated with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, 
and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be 
rehabilitated, then the commission shall order that there be 
paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68(1), for such period of time 
beginning with the time that the payments (as in this section 
provided) to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier 
terminate and ending with the death of the employee. No 
employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits if he 
fails or refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational 
rehabilitation as set forth herein. 
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disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 
35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess 
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week for 312 weeks. 
Effective 5/10/83. 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of computation. 
- (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the average 
weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of injury shall 
be taken as the basis upon which to compute the weekly 
compensation rate and shall be determined as follows: 
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed 
by the year, the average weekly wage shall be that yearly wage 
divided by 52. 
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed 
by the month, the average weekly wage shall be that monthly 
wage divided by 4 1/3. 
(c) If at the time of injury the wages are fixed by 
the week, that amount shall be the average weekly wage. 
(d) If at the time of injury the wages are fixed by 
the day, the weekly wage shall be determined by multiplying the 
daily wage by the number of days and fraction of days in the 
week during which the employee under a contract of hire was 
working at the time of his accident, or would have worked in 
the accident had not intervened. In no case shall the daily 
wage be multiplied by less than three for the purposes for 
determining the weekly wage. 
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(3) If none of the methods in section (1) will fairly 
determine the average weekly wage in a particular case, the 
commission shall use such other method as will, based upon the 
facts presented, fairly determine the employees average weekly 
wage. 
(4) When the average weekly wage of the injured 
employee at the time of injury is determined as in this section 
provided, it shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute 
the weekly compensation rate. After the weekly compensation 
has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. 
